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OVERREACH AND INNOVATION IN
EQUALITY REGULATION
OLATUNDE C.A. JOHNSON†
ABSTRACT
At a time of heightened concern about agency overreach, this Article
highlights a less appreciated development in agency equality
regulation. Moving beyond traditional bureaucratic forms of
regulation, civil rights agencies in recent years have experimented with
new forms of regulation to advance inclusion. This new “inclusive
regulation” can be described as more open ended, less coercive, and
more reliant on rewards, collaboration, flexibility, and interactive
assessment than traditional modes of civil rights regulation. This
Article examines the power and limits of this new inclusive regulation
and suggests a framework for increasing the efficacy of these new
modes of regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
This Symposium was inspired by a sense of possibility that
administrative law and federal agencies might play a central role in
advancing equality and social inclusion.1 This possibility reflected what
seemed to be a growing empirical reality. Over the past decade, federal
agencies have increasingly taken on the antidiscrimination project,
actively promulgating regulations and guidance to advance inclusion in
areas such as housing, education, and employment.2 This unleashing of
administrative power has roots in prior presidential administrations,3
but it is partially explained by two terms of a presidential
administration favorable to an active administrative state and to
particular civil rights goals. This emphasis on agencies as a source of
civil rights norms has occurred alongside a gridlocked Congress that
has struggled to respond to a changing civil rights landscape.4 It occurs

1. I use the term “inclusion” to reference goals that extend beyond nondiscrimination to
include the advancement of participation and opportunity for groups or individuals that face
systemic barriers. These barriers may be based on identity categories such as gender, ethnicity,
disability, or race but may also include barriers such as poverty or geographic isolation that are
not typically associated with an antidiscrimination or civil rights framework.
2. For examples of these agency actions, see infra notes 37, 46, 56, 69 and accompanying
text.
3. See generally Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality
Directives in American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339 (2012) (describing regulatory initiatives to
promote civil rights through the administrations of Presidents Kennedy, Nixon, Clinton, and
George W. Bush).
4. For instance, Congress has been unable to enact protections against discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. See Equality Act, S. 1858, 114th Cong. (2015);
Equality Act, H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. (2015). According to the Washington Times, the most recent
bills stood “no chance of passage” in the current Republican-controlled Congress. Juan A.
Lozano & David Crary, Showdown in Houston over LGBT Nondiscrimination Ordinance,
WASH. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/oct/25/showdown-inhouston-over-lgbt-nondiscrimination-or [https://perma.cc/RX7W-DFXS]. In this vacuum, the
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has interpreted “sex” discrimination
in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to extend to certain forms of discrimination based on
an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity. What You Should Know About EEOC and
the Enforcement Protections for LGBT Workers, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/enforcement_protections_lgbt_workers.cfm [https://
perma.cc/UFG2-HRR7]. One of the most prominent examples of administrative action as a
response to a gridlocked Congress is President Obama’s executive action providing temporary
immigration relief for certain categories of undocumented immigrants, an area of law beyond the
scope of this Article. For a discussion of the legality of these executive immigration actions, see
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at a time in which the limits of private enforcement and judicial
remedies in addressing contemporary problems of exclusion have
increasingly become apparent. Certain legal scholars have embraced
the role of administrative agencies in regulating civil rights under the
rubric of “administrative constitutionalism,” a framework that
celebrates agency interpretation of landmark statutes to advance
fundamental principles.5 More generally, scholars provide accounts of
administrative agencies as enduring sources of norms that can rival
courts.6 They offer theories of entrenchment as a counter to fears that
positive administrative regulation is easily unwound by changes in the
executive.7
This Symposium represents an opportunity to take stock of these
agency-driven equality initiatives and to contemplate new directions.
One might always have worried about outsize faith in administrative
agencies, as opposed to courts or legislatures, for advancing equality
goals. Administrative agencies might be vital to filling gaps and
deliberating with interest groups,8 but administrative action might also
be seen as second best, a stopgap where legislation could not be
achieved. Many of the administrative directives that one might
celebrate lack private enforcement, depriving those who seek to
advance civil rights goals of courts as an avenue for implementation.
In the wake of a new administration in 2017, the role of
administrative agencies in equality law seems suddenly unclear.
Transitions from Democratic to Republican administrations are often

generally Ming H. Chen, Beyond Legality: The Legitimacy of Executive Action in Immigration
Law, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87 (2016).
5. See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1898
(2013) (providing as an example the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s
(HUD) promulgation of regulations implementing a disparate impact standard under the Fair
Housing Act (FHA)); Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U.
L. REV. 519, 523 (2015).
6. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES:
THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 33 (2010) (providing a paradigmatic account of
“administrative constitutionalism”); Metzger, supra note 5, at 1898 (rooting “administrative
constitutionalism” in the “central role that the modem administrative state plays in our
constitutional system today”); Ross, supra note 5, at 523 (arguing that “constitutional adaptation”
to changing social contexts is necessary and that administrative constitutionalism can
“supplement other forms of adaptation that primarily occur in courts”).
7. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 6, at 7–8, 12–22, 127–32 (describing the
entrenchment of administrative norms through deliberation and administrative implementation).
8. See id. at 29–33 (describing administrative agency interaction with social movements and
the process of dialogic deliberation between branches through which emerge “new fundamental
principles and policies”).
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accompanied by less vigorous civil rights enforcement.9 The future is
more uncertain today than in the usual partisan transition. The current
transition features a President with policy commitments that are not
well delineated and that are shifting even as one writes. To the extent
that one can predict from recent appointments and statements, the
future of administratively enforced and generated civil rights rules
seems bleak.10

9. As an example, over the last three decades civil rights advocates and political figures
have faulted the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for failing to enforce civil rights laws under
Republican administrations. See, e.g., Edward M. Kennedy, Restoring the Civil Rights Division, 2
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 211, 212–24 (2008) (claiming that the George W. Bush administration
politicized enforcement decisions in the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division and failed to vigorously
enforce the law in voting and employment discrimination); Charlie Savage, Report Examines Civil
Rights Enforcement During Bush Years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2009, at A26 (describing the results
of a report by the General Accounting Office documenting the George W. Bush administration’s
failure to bring enforcement actions involving race and gender discrimination); LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE, Why Reynolds Lost, CIV. RTS. MONITOR (Aug. 1985), http://www.civilrights.org/
monitor/august1985/art2p1.html [https://perma.cc/S6FK-8TEK] (arguing that the Civil Rights
Division, when led by Reagan appointee Brad Reynolds, had “the worst civil rights record of any
administration in more than half a century—in education, housing, voting, employment, disability
rights, and women’s rights”).
10. As an example, incoming Secretary of HUD Ben Carson has previously stated that he
opposes the Obama administration’s fair housing rules, which are discussed later in this Article.
For further discussion of the rules regarding disparate impact and affirmatively furthering
fair housing, see infra notes 70–73 and accompanying text. See Ben S. Carson, Experimenting with
Failed Socialism Again, WASH. TIMES (July 23, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2015/jul/23/ben-carson-obamas-housing-rules-try-to-accomplish [https://perma.cc/Q3GRXRFU] (characterizing the Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH) rule as “socialism”
and misguided “social engineering”). In his confirmation hearing, Carson stated in response to
questioning about the AFFH rule that he opposed the “central dictation to people’s lives.” See
Nomination of Dr. Benjamin Carson: Hearing Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs United States Senate, 115th Cong. 14 (2017), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG115shrg24428/pdf/CHRG-115shrg24428.pdf [https://perma.cc/HKS4-DVZR]. In addition, it is
unclear whether the incoming leadership of the DOJ will vigorously enforce civil rights laws. The
Senate confirmed the U.S. Attorney General over strong opposition from civil rights advocates
and over 1100 law professors. See Eric Lichtblau & Matt Flegenheimer, Jeff Sessions
Confirmed as Attorney General Capping Bitter Battle, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/us/politics/jeff-sessions-attorney-general-confirmation.html [https
://perma.cc/C4M8-7TUK]; Sari Horwitz, More than 1,100 Law School Professors Nationwide
Oppose Sessions’s Nomination as Attorney General, WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/more-than-1100-law-school-professors-nationwideoppose-sessionss-nomination-as-attorney-general/2017/01/03/dbf55750-d1cc-11e6-a783-cd3fa950
f2fd_story.html?utm_term=.1def7d588423 [https://perma.cc/SE6F-5PFR] (noting opposition
based in part on Sessions’s record of pursuing prosecutions against civil rights activists for alleged
voting fraud in the 1980s, and his opposition to legislative efforts to protect women and LGBT
individuals from discrimination); Letter from the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human
Rights to Mitch McConnell, Senate Majority Leader, Harry Reid, Senate Minority Leader,
Chuck Grassley, Senator, and Patrick Leahy, Senator (Dec. 1, 2016), http://civilrightsdocs.info/
pdf/policy/letters/2016/Sessions-Nomination-12-1-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z794-6XDU] (raising
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For this reason, this Article may be more elegiac than initially
envisioned. The aim of the Article is to capture the possibilities of civil
rights regulation, even while grappling with the resistance agency
regulation engenders. Civil rights agencies once decried for doing
nothing are now implicated as perhaps doing too much. At a time of
heightened concern about agency overreach, the Article aims to
highlight a less appreciated development in agency equality regulation.
In this development, civil rights regulation is not simply deploying
traditional bureaucratic forms of regulation such as prohibitions and
conditional spending. Agencies are also experimenting with new forms
of regulation that might in theory be more palatable to those skeptical
of traditional top-down regulation as well as to reformers looking for
effective strategies to advance inclusion.
Critics have long faulted civil rights agencies for regulatory
overreach but these critiques became increasingly clamorous even
before the 2016 election. Academic commentators charge federal
agencies with bureaucratic regulation of innocent sexual conduct;11
employers, courts, and Congress contest the legitimacy of agency
efforts to prohibit discrimination against individuals with arrest and
conviction records;12 and recent federal agency actions on genderidentity discrimination have prompted a showdown with several
states.13 The aforementioned agency actions may be novel; but the
complaints raise familiar concerns in the administrative law and civil
rights arena regarding transparency, public participation, and the
proper role of agencies in statutory implementation.
Today, these concerns about bureaucratic overreach are taking
place even as novel forms of regulation by civil rights agencies have
emerged that might be subject to the converse criticism. The traditional
model of civil rights enforcement centers on top-down, bureaucratic

concerns about Sessions’s record on voting rights, gender equity, and LGBT rights, among other
areas). Although the DOJ does not itself promulgate the types of regulations and guidance
discussed in this Article, its Civil Rights Division plays a role in coordinating regulatory activity
involving particular civil rights statutes. See, e.g., Coordination of Enforcement of NonDiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 28 C.F.R. §§ 42.401–415 (2011) (detailing the role
of the DOJ in coordinating Title VI implementation across federal agencies).
11. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 881,
881 (2016).
12. For further discussion on employers’, courts’, and Congress’s pushback against
prohibiting discrimination of individuals with arrest and conviction records, see infra notes 46–50
and accompanying text.
13. For further discussion of lawsuits between federal agencies and states on gender-identity
discrimination, see infra notes 37–45 and accompanying text.
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enforcement, specifically prohibitions on discrimination enforced
through private enforcement in courts or agencies14 or through
termination of funding in federal spending programs.15 At the federal
level, civil rights agencies are increasingly using forms of regulation
that can be described as open ended, less coercive, and more reliant on
rewards, collaboration, and interactive assessment than traditional
modes of civil rights regulation. Examples include competitive grant
programs by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) that reward
programs that effectively train women and minorities in
underrepresented industries, as well as partnerships by federal
agencies that encourage state and local efforts to build affordable
housing and redesign transportation infrastructure in a manner that
operates to combat, rather than exacerbate, racial and economic
segregation.16 These programs rely not just on the “stick” of federal
fund termination but also on “carrots” and grant incentives. Even
regulations that appear to take the familiar form of conditional
spending, such as the recently promulgated agency guidelines requiring
grantees to affirmatively further fair housing, place emphasis on
processes for developing new solutions aiming to catalyze federal
partnerships with states and other grantees and encourage selfassessment toward collaborative problem solving.
This Article refers to these new regulations as “inclusive
regulation” to capture three aspects. First, they rely on a less coercive
model of regulation. Instead, the model draws on the rhetoric of
innovation in the current zeitgeist, one that values self-regulation,
crowd-sourced and evidence-based solutions, and creative disruption
of existing models.17 These regulations also are resonant of ideas in
administrative law over the last two decades that emphasize regulation
through collaboration and cooperation with states, localities, and other
regulated entities; regulation as problem-solving; and the potentially
catalyzing role of subsidizing innovation.18 Though it may be familiar
14. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012) (granting
individuals the right to bring suit after exhausting claims with the EEOC).
15. See, e.g., id. tit. VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (listing processes for fund termination after a
finding of noncompliance).
16. For a description of grant making in the areas of labor and housing, see infra notes 91–
94 and accompanying text.
17. For a description of features of this new, inclusive regulation, see infra notes 91–111 and
accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Lisa Blomgren Bingham, The Next Generation of Administrative Law: Building
the Legal Infrastructure for Collaborative Governance, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 297, 299–303, 342–48
(providing justification for increased deployment of collaborative governance and proposing a
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in other regulatory contexts, this mode of regulation is less familiar in
the civil rights context, which has depended on prohibitions and
traditional bureaucratic use of federal power.19 Second, they seek to
further “inclusion,” by which I mean they address barriers based not
just on identity discrimination but also those based on other factors
such as poverty and geography.20 In addition, rather than simply
preventing exclusion, they aim to promote inclusion and opportunity
for traditionally disadvantaged individuals and communities.21 Third,
they depend on regulatory power to issue guidance or rules, rather than
on adjudication in courts or agencies.22
At a time of concern about too much administrative power
exercised by civil rights agencies, one might legitimately wonder
whether these administrative initiatives proceed too far in the other
direction by being insufficiently coercive. These directives may thus
become susceptible to the critique that they lack adequate enforcement
and oversight mechanisms, and—because they depend on selfassessments—risk creating a nonuniform, patchwork civil rights
regime.23 My contribution to this Symposium considers the potential
and the limits of this emerging civil rights regulatory model and
suggests a framework for increasing the efficacy of these new modes of
regulation in a context of heightened concern about agency overreach.
Part I begins with the current moment of concern about civil rights
overreach against the backdrop of the countervailing concern that civil
rights agencies lack the tools, design, and political will to effectively
implement civil rights goals. Part II makes the case for rethinking civil
rights regulatory power given the challenges facing the current civil
legal framework for achieving the goals of accountability, efficiency, transparency, participation,
and collaboration); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1, 3–7, 21–31, 33–62 (1997) (proposing a normative model of collaborative
governance and providing examples from the environmental law context).
19. For examples of civil rights statutes that deploy federal power to prohibit discrimination
or regulate through the threat of funding termination, see supra notes 14–15.
20. For an example of such regulations, see the AFFH regulation, infra notes 105–06.
21. This is akin to promoting integration rather than just remedying segregation. For further
discussion of normative frameworks that seek to go beyond antidiscrimination and instead further
more capacious goals such as participation and opportunity, see Susan Sturm, The Architecture of
Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247, 249
(2006) (calling for new frameworks in the area of workplace equality that “expand[] beyond the
anti-discrimination paradigm that has shaped intervention over the last thirty years”).
22. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 1345–49, 1378, 1407 (describing the civil rights adjudicative
model in courts and in agencies).
23. For a critique of fair housing rules as lacking sufficiently vigorous enforcement
mechanisms, see infra note 117 and accompanying text.
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rights enforcement regime, including the general limits of a prohibitory
antidiscrimination approach. Part II then introduces the range of
emerging inclusive regulation by civil rights agencies, defining the new
regulation by three important features: (1) reliance on grants and other
voluntary, opt-in, competitive forms of regulation; (2) the disruption of
current boundaries between agencies and between traditional
compliance-based enforcement and regulation; and (3) public
participation as a catalyst for developing solutions and promoting
compliance and enforcement. Part II also presents an account of why
these forms of regulation might be emanating at this moment, arguing
that they are reactions to long-standing critiques of civil rights
bureaucracy as well as an attempt to retool administrative agencies to
better address both developing as well as embedded problems of
exclusion. Part III considers the future and the potential efficacy of this
mode of regulation, given the persistent critique of civil rights
bureaucratic power, and the converse critique that this regulatory form
is insufficiently directive to meaningfully advance inclusionary goals.
I. INCLUSIONARY OVERREACH?
Claims of overreach by civil rights agencies seem suddenly
ubiquitous. As civil rights agencies use administrative power to
respond to a set of pressing and emerging problems—including sexual
assault on campus, racial segregation in housing, and the consequences
of mass incarceration—resistance is evident from many quarters.
Arguments that civil rights agencies are exceeding their authority are
advanced by entities such as states, private-sector businesses, members
of Congress, and critics in the academy.24 Courts have joined the fray,
in key instances upholding challengers’ claims and enjoining recent
administrative guidance and regulations.25
These challenges and criticisms take a familiar form, combining
concerns about process, mode, and regulatory goals. Challengers
question whether agencies have overstepped their roles, the adequacy
of their deliberation and transparency, and the normative legitimacy of
what agencies are trying to do. Although it has become fashionable in
the legal academy to celebrate agencies’ role as norm entrepreneurs,26
these more recent critiques cast agency action in a more dubious light.

24. See infra notes 30–36 and accompanying text.
25. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 6, at 19; Metzger, supra note 5, at 1901.
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Agencies’ role as entrepreneurial innovators bumps against a familiar
strain in American governance that questions the power and legitimacy
of civil rights agencies.
A. Criticism of Agency Overreach
Among the agencies most subject to scrutiny and challenge in
recent years has been the U.S. Department of Education (DOE), in
particular for its regulatory activities related to the issue of campus
sexual assault. The DOE’s 2011 “Dear Colleague” letter to highereducation institutions, which offered “significant guidance” specifying
the obligations of higher-education institutions pursuant to Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972 to respond to sexual harassment
and violence claims, is the provocation.27 The guidance purports to
make no new law but simply to clarify how the DOE will interpret Title
IX when faced with evaluating complaints by alleged victims about the
adequacy of schools’ procedures for responding to complaints.28
Nevertheless, schools, political leaders, and members of the public
have charged that the 2011 letter, and ensuing guidance and pamphlets,
exceeds the DOE’s statutory power and fails to incorporate the views
of the public and regulated entities. Three lawsuits to date challenge
the legality of the DOE’s guidance, claiming that it violates the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it was issued without
notice and comment.29
27. See Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office for Civil Rights,
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Colleagues (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/
letters/colleague-201104.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZ9J-WTX9] [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter].
The letter stemmed from the DOE’s enforcement of Title IX, which forbids discrimination on the
basis of “sex,” and the resulting court-established jurisprudence that holds that Title IX forbids
peer-on-peer sexual harassment. Specifically, the guidance requires that schools have certain
procedures in place to investigate claims of sexual harassment and violence including notice,
staffing, and particular grievance procedures. Id. Further, the guidance specifies the requirements
for how investigations should be conducted, including requiring prompt resolution. Id. Hearings
and investigations should be governed on a “preponderance of the evidence” standard. Id.
Finally, the guidance offers proactive efforts that schools should “consider” to prevent sexual
assaults on campus and to respond effectively. Id.
28. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON
TITLE IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2014), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa201404-title-ix.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Z2F-4KDE].
29. See Amended Complaint at 3, 21, 25, Doe v. Lhamon, No. 16-cv-01158-RC (D.D.C. Aug.
15, 2016) (including in a complaint by a University of Virginia law student an allegation that the
Dear Colleague letter violates the APA by promulgating requirements without notice and
comment and by mandating a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in on-campus
adjudications of sexual assault claims); Complaint at 17, Ehrhart v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 16cv-01302-SCJ (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2016) (documenting a suit by a Georgia representative claiming
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Even those who purport to share the goals of reducing sexual
assault on campus are asking whether the DOE has gone too far.30
Critics ask whether the DOE should, as matter of both law and policy,
have had greater public participation and formally adhered to the APA
notice-and-comment procedures, which serve to ensure public input
and reasoned deliberation.31 Commentators also raise questions about
the substance of the rule, most frequently whether the DOE had a basis
for adopting the “preponderance of the evidence” standard and
whether the rules themselves are sufficiently protective of the due
process rights of the accused.32 Some commentators build on this
argument to raise a more generalized concern about bureaucratic
overreach,33 an argument that is resonant of long-standing critiques of
the exercise of power by civil rights agencies.34 In this vein, two scholars
that the DOE violated the APA by issuing the Dear Colleague letter without notice and
comment); Complaint and Jury Demand at 48–49, Neal v. Colo. State Univ.–Pueblo, No. 16-cv00873-WYD (D. Co. Apr. 19, 2016) (including in a complaint by a Colorado State University–
Pueblo student an allegation that the DOE violated the APA by evading the requisite notice-andcomment procedure). The Doe v. Lhamon case was spearheaded by the Foundation for
Individual Rights in Education. See Mission, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN EDUC.,
https://www.thefire.org/about-us/mission [https://perma.cc/F2M8-Q8QU]. Most universities have
not directly resisted the DOE guidance, but a higher-education institution subject to DOE
regulation did join one of the lawsuits in August 2016. See generally Amended Complaint, supra
(involving Oklahoma Wesleyan University as a plaintiff in the suit against the DOE).
30. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, BOS.
GLOBE (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-harvardsexual-harassment-policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html
[https://perma.cc/5W
MA-X6ZF]; David Rudovsky et al., Open Letter from Members of the Penn Law School Faculty:
Sexual Assault Complaints: Protecting Complainants and the Accused Students at Universities,
PHILLY.COM (Feb. 18, 2015), http://media.philly.com/documents/OpenLetter.pdf [https://perma.
cc/Z7XK-TTTN].
31. Relatedly, some commentators question whether higher-education institutions have the
capacity to investigate and adjudicate sexual assault claims. See Janet Napolitano, “Only Yes
Means Yes”: An Essay on University Policies Regarding Sexual Violence and Sexual Assault, 33
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 387, 388 (2015).
32. See Stephen Henrick, A Hostile Environment for Student Defendants: Title IX and Sexual
Assault on College Campuses, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 49, 62 (2013) (“[T]he Letter
institutes . . . procedural reforms of campus sexual assault trials that will lead to increased
convictions, irrespective of an accused student’s guilt or innocence.”); Tamara Rice Lave, Campus
Sexual Assault Adjudication: Why Universities Should Reject the Dear Colleague Letter, 64 U.
KAN. L. REV. 915, 946–56 (2016) (arguing that universities should adopt alternative remedies for
addressing claims of sexual assault including “restorative justice” and that claims that must be
adjudicated should adopt the higher “clear and convincing evidence” standard).
33. For an example of the concern regarding the scope of the DOE’s Title IX guidance, see
infra note 35–36 and accompanying text.
34. Fearing federal administrative power, members of congress successfully sought changes
to early versions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to weaken the power of the EEOC to enforce
Title VII. See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE
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in a recent piece critique the DOE for launching the “sex
bureaucracy,” one in which “the federal bureaucracy is now regulating
sex itself.”35 The fault lies, according to this account, with how power is
exercised by agencies (the use of “bureaucratic tools” and the creation
of “mini bureaucracies within nongovernmental institutions to
administer these procedural obligations”) and with what agencies are
now doing (“the federal bureaucracy is now regulating sex itself”).36 In
this sense, the DOE’s action has unleashed familiar and persistent
concerns about the power of civil rights agencies in particular to
unsettle relations that are more properly the domain of individuals,
families, or local communities.
The DOE’s regulatory actions with regard to preventing
discrimination based on a student’s sexual identity have provoked
similar concerns. In May 2016, the DOE issued a Dear Colleague letter
propounding significant “guidance,” that “clarifies” that the DOE
treats a student’s gender identity as a student’s sex for purposes of Title
IX,37 prompting pushback from some states and local schools districts.38
Specifically, the Dear Colleague letter on gender identity affirms that
Title IX requires equal access to educational programs and activities,
and it specifies that, in creating identification documents and
determining use of traditionally sex-segregated facilities such as
bathrooms, schools should treat students consistent with their gender
identity.39 Echoing challenges to the sexual assault guidance, Texas and
ten other states challenged the rules claiming that the 2016 guidance
misinterpreted Title IX and failed to adhere to APA requirements.40

LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 117–19 (2010) (describing these legislative changes). In other domains,
political leaders and regulated entities have pushed back against federal agencies that have sought
to promote integration. See generally CHRISTOPHER BONASTIA, KNOCKING ON THE DOOR: THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ATTEMPT TO DESEGREGATE THE SUBURBS (2006) (describing
resistance to HUD’s desegregation efforts during the Nixon administration).
35. Gersen & Suk, supra note 11, at 883.
36. Id. at 883–84. Professors Jacob Gersen and Jeannie Suk argue that the effect of the
DOE’s activity is to regulate “ordinary sex”—“voluntary adult sexual conduct that does not harm
others.” Id. at 885.
37. See Letter from Catherine Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office of Civil
Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. & Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights
Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Colleague (May 13, 2016) [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter on
Transgender Students].
38. For a description of legal challenges to the Title IX guidance, see infra note 40.
39. Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students, supra note 37, at 7 (citing 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.33 (2016)).
40. See Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 815–16, 819 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (order
granting preliminary injunction), appeal docketed, No. 16-11534 (5th Cir. Oct. 21, 2016). Plaintiffs
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In late August 2016, a district court granted a nationwide injunction
preventing enforcement of the guidance.41 In a contrary ruling, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the DOE’s guidance,
holding that the interpretations were based on the DOE’s valid
regulations and that the agency was entitled to deference in the
interpretation of these regulations.42 The Supreme Court initially
agreed to review the Fourth Circuit’s decision,43 but after the Trump
administration withdrew the guidance,44 the Court remanded the case
back to the Fourth Circuit.45
Apart from the DOE, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s (EEOC) regulatory actions have similarly faced legal
challenges and political opposition. The EEOC in 2012 promulgated

also include a school district in Alabama, two school districts in Arizona, and the governor of
Maine. Siding with the challengers, the district court rejected the DOE and other defendants’
contention that the Dear Colleague letter and other documents were mere guidance that did not
confer any rights or carry the force of law. Id. at 836. According to the district court, the guidelines
were final agency action under the APA: they represented a “consummation” of the agency’s
decisionmaking process. Id. at 824 (quoting Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. EPA, 635 F.3d 738,
755–56 (5th Cir. 2011)). According to the district court, the guidance had practical legal
consequence since the agency’s view of the law could force the regulated party “either to alter its
conduct, or expose itself to potential liability.” Id. (quoting Texas v. EEOC, 827 F.3d 372, 383
(5th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, opinion withdrawn, vacated, 838 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2016). The
district court reasoned that the Dear Colleague letter was in effect a legislative rule, not merely
an interpretive statement, and thus should have gone through the APA notice-and-comment
process. See id. at 830. Finally, the court held that the DOE’s guidance documents were not
entitled to deference because they contradicted the plain meaning of the statute and were
inconsistent with existing, unambiguous regulations. Id. at 832–33.
41. See id. at 836.
42. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 723 (4th Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 369 (Oct. 28, 2016) (No. 16-273), vacated and remanded, No. 19-273, 2017 WL
855755 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2017) (mem.).
43. The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court’s determination that the regulation
upon which the guidance was based was ambiguous, and thus the DOE interpretation was entitled
to Auer deference unless the regulation was plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.
Id. at 719, 721 (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)). Applying this standard, the
Fourth Circuit found the DOE’s interpretation inconsistent with the “varying physical,
psychological, and social aspects . . . included in the [dictionary definition of the] term ‘sex.’” Id.
at 722. The Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari to review the Fourth Circuit
decision. See Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 369 (Oct. 28, 2016) (No.
16-273).
44. Letter from Sandra Battle, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office of Civil Rights,
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., and T.E. Wheeler II, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to Colleague (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/941
551/download [https://perma.cc/5D2B-H7QN] (withdrawing a statement of policy and guidance
on transgender students).
45. See Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, No. 19-273, 2017 WL 855755, at *1
(U.S. Mar. 6, 2017) (mem.) (vacating and remanding to the Fourth Circuit).
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guidance stating that an employer’s reliance on arrest and conviction
status as the basis of an employment decision may in some instances
violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s prohibitions on
discrimination on the basis of race and national origin.46 The guidance
recommends a set of best practices and “safe harbors” for employers
to follow to avoid liability.47 Members of Congress have sharply
questioned the EEOC on its guidance in oversight hearings and have
introduced three bills that would prevent the EEOC from enforcing
this guidance.48 Although the congressional oversight and activity has
not so far resulted in legislation, a federal appellate court allowed
litigation brought by the state of Texas challenging the EEOC’s
guidance to go forward.49
B. Criticism of Agency Goals and Process
For observers of civil rights agencies, these claims—made by
scholars, regulated entities, and members of Congress—that agencies
46. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in
Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, No. 915.002, U.S. EQUAL
EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Apr. 25, 2012), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrest
_conviction.cfm [https://perma.cc/S2QN-59EA] (discussing potential violations of Title VII’s
disparate treatment and disparate impact provisions).
47. See generally id. (recommending proper screening, training, and confidentiality
procedures).
48. See, e.g., H.R. 4959, EEOC Transparency and Accountability Act, H.R. 5422,
Litigation Oversight Act of 2014, and H.R. 5423, Certainty in Enforcement Act of 2014: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Workforce Protections of the H. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce,
113th Cong. 7 (2014), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg89724/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg
89724.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJD3-7SRD] (“[T]he agency’s edict restricting the use of criminal
background checks is putting people in harm’s way . . . .” (statement of Rep. Tim Walberg,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Workforce Protections)); The Regulatory and Enforcement Priorities of
the EEOC: Examining the Concerns of Stakeholders: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Workforce
Protections of the H. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 113th Cong. 1 (2014) (examining recent
EEOC actions particularly related to concerns with “policies that many believe are not in the best
interest of workers and employers,” including 2012 guidance regarding the use of criminal
background checks in employer hiring (statement of Rep. Tim Walberg, Chairman, Subcomm. on
Workforce Protections)).
49. Specifically, Texas filed a lawsuit to enjoin the EEOC from enforcing its guidance,
claiming that the EEOC’s guidance on arrest and conviction was a binding substantive
interpretation of Title VII, which was forbidden by the statute, and in violation of the APA. After
a district court dismissed the suit for lack of standing, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in June 2016 reversed, holding that Texas had standing. See Texas v. EEOC, 827 F.3d 372,
377 (5th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, opinion withdrawn, vacated, 838 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2016).
Though the EEOC lacks power to bring direct enforcement actions against state employers, see
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012), the court found that failure to conform with the safe harbors in
the guidance might cause the EEOC to investigate a state and refer it to the U.S. Attorney
General to pursue litigation, see EEOC, 827 F.3d at 383–84.
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are exercising too much power are striking. A long-standing complaint
of civil rights reformers is that agencies lack regulatory power and fail
to rely effectively on the powers they have. Yet the current claims
suggest that the deployment of these relatively weak forms of
regulatory power, such as guidance documents, are nonetheless
perceived by some as too intrusive.
The EEOC, for instance, lacks substantive rulemaking power.
Title VII, the fair-employment provisions, grants the EEOC power to
issue procedural regulations but not the power to issue substantive
regulations defining the ambit of Title VII.50 This impotence was the
congressional choice that prevailed, a choice with the precise goal of
limiting federal power over employers.51 For this reason, the EEOC
guidance does not typically garner strong deference from the Court.52
Similarly, while the DOE has formal regulatory power, it often acts
through guidance rather than formal rulemaking. Functionally, the
agency uses guidance to give clarity to regulated authorities as to the
DOE’s interpretation of its spending clause statutes—in the case of
sexual assault and gender identity in schools, Title IX. Civil rights
reformers have long faulted agencies for failing to enforce their
authority to terminate funding under these programs or to effectively
supervise grantees.53 Yet the legal challenges to these weak forms of
regulation must depend on the notion that guidance has legal
consequences. As a district court recently found in the context of the

50. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a).
51. See generally FARHANG, supra note 34, at 117–19 (describing the formal weakness of the
EEOC and the legislative choices that shaped it); ROBERT C. LIEBERMAN, SHAPING RACE
POLICY: THE UNITED STATES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 162–63 (2005) (explaining the
legislative compromise that led to the allotment of powers held by the EEOC).
52. See Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 1937, 1941–45 (2006). As Professor Melissa Hart has noted, even where the
EEOC has formal rulemaking power, as for procedural regulations or for certain provisions in
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12116, the Court has not consistently
afforded the agency Chevron deference. Id.
53. See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: EXAMINING THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VI AND
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,898, at 1–5 (2016) (summarizing findings that the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has been unable to effectively respond to Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 environmental-justice complaints); Michael Allen, No Certification, No Money; The
Revival of Civil Rights Obligations in HUD Funding Programs, 78 PLAN. COMMISSIONERS J. 16,
16 (2010) (documenting HUD’s history of failing to enforce certification rules to promote
integrated housing).
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EEOC, the agency’s view of the law could force the regulated party
“either to alter its conduct, or expose itself to potential liability.”54
One could say that these challenges to the legitimacy of agency
action are simply an attempt to shift civil rights agencies away from
relying on forms of regulation (like guidance) that lack the
transparency and formal indicia of reasoned decisionmaking that are
present when an agency deploys notice-and-comment rulemaking. The
failure to safeguard against arbitrary administrative action is a
consistent concern raised by academic critics of the DOE’s actions in
particular.55 From the perspective of understanding the broader
political critique of civil rights agencies, however, it is worth noting that
these legitimacy concerns are not confined to agencies that fail to
deploy notice-and-comment rulemaking. Even where civil rights
agencies are exercising their rulemaking power and complying with
agency procedures, challengers raise questions about the process and
goal of regulation.
A recent example of a challenge to the legitimacy of civil rights
regulation is found in criticisms of the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development’s (HUD) 2015 rulemaking delineating the Fair
Housing Act’s (FHA) requirement that federal agencies and grantees
“affirmatively further fair housing.”56 The statutory requirement had
gone largely undefined for the forty-five years since the passage of the
FHA until a fair housing group challenged a county grantee for failing
to meaningfully comply with the statutory requirement.57 The lawsuit
prompted HUD to strengthen its regulation and to delineate what is
required of grantees. Despite the statutory directive and the use of
notice-and-comment rulemaking, groups have criticized HUD’s
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH) regulation as an
infringement on state and local power and faulted the regulations for
engaging in “social engineering.”58 Members of Congress have
54. See EEOC, 827 F.3d. at 383.
55. For the critique of the DOE’s misuse of its regulatory power, see supra notes 32–36.
56. See Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,272 (July 16, 2015)
(to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, and 903) (“Through this final rule, HUD
provides HUD program participants with an approach to more effectively and efficiently
incorporate into their planning processes the duty to affirmatively further the purposes and
policies of the Fair Housing Act, which is title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.”).
57. See United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. v. Westchester Cty., 668 F. Supp. 2d
548, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
58. See Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, Where Should a Poor Family Live?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/05/opinion/where-should-a-poor-family-live.html
[https://perma.cc/CM8Q-RPU7] (describing claims of opponents that HUD’s AFFH rule
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introduced measures to curtail HUD’s spending to enforce the
requirement, which have so far not advanced.
HUD’s 2014 regulations on disparate impact provide another
example. At this writing, homeowner’s insurance industry groups are
challenging HUD’s disparate impact regulations59 as unlawful.60 This
challenge persists even after the Supreme Court, in its 2015 decision in
Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc. (ICP),61 affirmed that the FHA’s
antidiscrimination mandate extends to unjustified disparate impacts.62
As the ICP case did not address the validity of HUD’s rule, it provided
a sufficient window for this subsequent lawsuit claiming that key
aspects of HUD’s regulations exceeded the scope of the statute.63
These scholarly, political, and legal challenges to agency action
question both the process of civil rights regulation and its goals. On one
level, the process critiques posit that the regulatory actions proceeded
with insufficient public input and deliberation and fail to conform to
the requirements of the APA. But the critiques embed a broader
constitutes “social engineering”); see also Jeremy Carl, The Obama Administration Thinks
Hillary’s Hometown is Racist: Does Congress Agree?, NAT’L REV. (May 18, 2016, 9:42 AM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/435531/obama-administration-thinks-hillarys-hometownracist-does-congress-agree [https://perma.cc/KY25-XB4G] (“AFFH undercuts the independence
of suburbs, towns, and small cities by forcing them to make up for supposed ‘imbalances’ in the
racial, ethnic, and class composition of their greater metropolitan regions.”).
59. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. at 42,272. HUD’s regulations
interpret the FHA prohibition on discrimination to extend to actions with an unjustified disparate
impact on a protected group, and they provide a burden-shifting framework for proving
discrimination in courts and in agency adjudication. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s
Discriminatory Effect Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24
C.F.R. pt. 100).
60. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. HUD, 74 F. Supp. 3d 30, 31 (D.D.C. 2014), vacated and remanded,
No. 14-5321, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16894 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 23, 2015) (per curiam).
61. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507
(2015).
62. See id. at 2510 (holding that the FHA’s text and purpose supported disparate impact
liability).
63. Prior to Inclusive Communities Project, the district court in American Insurance held that
HUD had exceeded its statutory authority in interpreting the FHA to extend to “disparate
impact.” Am. Ins. Ass’n, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 32 (finding that HUD’s disparate impact rule exceeded
the agency’s statutory authority). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the
American Insurance decision after Inclusive Communities Project. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. HUD,
No. 14-5321, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16894 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 23, 2015) (per curiam). The district
court nonetheless allowed the case to go forward on the question of whether the disparate impact
rule exceeds HUD’s authority to the extent it applies to insurers’ ratemaking and underwriting
decisions. See Amended Complaint at 17–20, Am. Ins. Ass’n, 74 F. Supp. 3d 30. HUD has moved
for summary judgment. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Am. Ins. Ass’n, 74 F. Supp.
3d 30.
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critique of process, particularly apparent when the target is not “soft”
guidance but rulemaking. The broader charge is that agencies in their
regulatory action on sexual assault, gender identity, ex-offenders, or
housing integration have intruded on intimate domains—domains that
are better left to states or local communities. And these process
challenges are likely fueled by a concern about the specific areas in
which the agencies seek to regulate: substantive matters over which
there are deep disagreements such as employment of ex-offenders,
gender identity, and where housing for poor people and minorities
should be located.
Indeed, in the end it may be too difficult to disentangle whether
these challenges are about the goals or the misuse of administrative
power to achieve those goals. What is clear is that this conflation of
form and function in challenging the regulatory action of civil rights
agencies is not entirely new. Long before claims of “sex bureaucracy,”
or “social engineering” through bureaucracy, opponents challenged
the DOE for, in effect, promoting a race bureaucracy that sought to
advance integration in education.64 Prominent scholars have cast the
work of the EEOC and other agencies in the 1960s and early 1970s, in
particular with respect to its disparate impact guidance, as a creative
hijacking of the meaning of 1964 Act. One prominent account argues
that administrative agencies improperly transformed the Civil Rights
Act of 1964’s mandate of antidiscrimination and colorblindness into a
mechanism for advancement of group-based rights.65 Critics charged
President Richard Nixon’s program of affirmative action in federal
contracting as a usurpation of congressional power.66
Connecting current critiques to earlier periods does not dispose of
legitimate concerns about transparency, participation, and fidelity to
statutory interpretation. Rather it is meant to suggest that the
invocation of regulatory power by civil rights agencies has always been
contested, and those contestations have often surfaced as attacks on
64. See generally STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY
OF TITLE VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1995) (articulating some of the criticisms of federal

actions pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
65. See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 456–58 (1990). Scholars have in
turn questioned Professor Hugh Graham’s assessment. See, e.g., Neal Devins, The Civil Rights
Hydra, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1723, 1725 (1991) (book review) (questioning some of Graham’s
characterizations).
66. See J. Larry Hood, The Nixon Administration and the Revised Philadelphia Plan for
Affirmative Action: A Study in Expanding Presidential Power and Divided Government, 23
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 145, 150–54 (1993) (describing resistance to the “Philadelphia Plan” as
an unconstitutional usurpation of power away from Congress by the DOL).
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the misuse of bureaucratic power. These concerns about bureaucracy
are long-standing and are often difficult to disentangle from resistance
to substantive goals.
II. RETHINKING INCLUSIONARY REGIMES
This Part shows how, against the backdrop of these concerns about
bureaucratic overreach, civil rights agencies are retooling conventional
bureaucratic forms of regulation to advance inclusion. The current
clamor about the legitimacy of civil rights regulation risks rendering
agencies more reluctant to use regulatory power. And yet the
complexity of civil rights problems today and the inefficacy of
traditional solutions would seem to demand a greater role for agencies
in developing innovative approaches to advance equality and inclusion.
This Part provides a positive account of the civil rights regulations
of the kind described in Part I, which one can see as regulatory
responses to an emerging set of problems using long-standing informal
and formal regulatory power. This Part suggests that, although the
regulatory tools that civil rights agencies are invoking are not
themselves new, they represent an attempt to address emerging
problems. To be sure, they occur in a space in which the
antidiscrimination norms are often contested. Yet functionally they
serve to catalyze institutions to respond far beyond the regulatory
space precisely governed by bureaucratic rules. This Part then presses
beyond these examples to show the emergence of new forms of
“inclusive regulation” that rely on carrots (grant making) in addition
to sticks (funding termination); encourage collaborative work with
regulated actors and communities; engage states, localities, and
communities in developing context-specific, evolving solutions rather
than mandating “top-down” solutions; and attempt to collapse
traditional boundaries between agencies.
A. Regulatory Responses to Emerging Problems
The current context of concern over civil rights overreach butts
against recent scholarly attention to agencies’ distinct role in flexibly
implementing statutes to respond to emerging problems.
Commentators have provided positive accounts of civil rights agencies’
capacity to use informal and formal regulatory powers to respond to
emerging problems of exclusion. Professors William Eskridge and
John Ferejohn’s influential account of the role of statutes in
instantiating enduring norms features the EEOC’s role in interpreting
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Title VII to protect women against discrimination based on pregnancy
in the face of constitutional rulings narrowing such protection.67
Agencies are celebrated for the capacity to deliberate and develop
expertise on particular problems. In the area of civil rights, this
emerges as the ability to engage with social movements to define
problems as they change and emerge.68 These accounts de-emphasize
the fear of bureaucratic power, but rather point to the advantages of
regulatory intervention generally, and in the civil rights area in
particular.
More recent agency action can be seen within this lens of
responsiveness and innovation for which agencies are well suited. In
addition to engaging with social movements, agencies have the capacity
to deliberate with regulated entities such as businesses and employers
not just through the formal process of notice and comment but through
outreach, interaction, and discussion. Civil rights agencies also have the
capacity to develop systemic solutions to problems identified through
individual adjudication or private enforcement in courts.69 Regulated
entities concerned about individual complaints (in agencies and in
courts) might look to an agency for guidance in hopes that it functions
as a “safe harbor” against complaints or to advance inclusionary goals
that are consistent with the regulated entities’ inclusionary values and
objectives.
Much of the recent regulation of civil rights agencies can be seen
through this framework of innovation, in which agencies are building
on long-standing tools to develop responses to contemporary problems
of exclusion. Agencies are not always taking the lead in developing new
interpretations of existing law. Indeed, courts often play this role. But
agencies expand the reach of these judicial interpretations through
rulemaking and guidance.

67. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 6, at 33–40 (describing the process of
administrative constitutionalism in which legislative and executive officials advance new
fundamental principles and policies).
68. See, e.g., id. (describing the EEOC’s interaction with women’s groups concerned about
pregnancy discrimination). See generally LIEBERMAN, supra note 51 (providing an account of the
EEOC’s interaction with civil rights groups like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund to identify
discriminatory employment barriers); Chen, supra note 4 (detailing the DOE’s interaction with
immigrant advocacy groups to develop guidelines on education of students with limited English
proficiency).
69. See JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 111–45 (1996)
(describing the development of the EEOC’s “disparate impact” standard as an administrative
solution to the EEOC’s limited capacity to address systemic complaints).

JOHNSON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1790

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

5/8/2017 1:47 PM

[Vol. 66:1771

In key instances, agencies are dusting off untapped regulatory
power. HUD, which has engaged in a range of regulatory activity to
clarify the FHA, provides an example. Between 2012 and 2016, HUD
issued the disparate impact rule70 and the rule requiring federal
grantees to affirmatively further fair housing71 discussed in Part I. In
addition, HUD formalized its standards for assessing claims of sexual
harassment under the FHA,72 promulgated rules prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity in
HUD-funded and HUD-operated housing programs,73 and provided
guidance on the FHA’s application to the use of criminal history in
making housing decisions in public and federally funded housing.74
Using regulatory tools that are uncontested, HUD’s actions aim to
respond to emerging problems. Yet the tools employed—notice-andcomment rulemaking and enforcement guidance—build on longstanding regulatory mechanisms.
Agencies are also responding to a void left by a gridlocked
Congress.75 Recent regulatory responses to the problem of wage
disparity provide an example. In recent years, advocates began to
highlight these problems related to wage disparity, and efforts to
strengthen legislative protection from wage discrimination have stalled
in Congress.76 In the void, agencies have begun to craft responses using
existing regulatory tools in new ways. Specifically, the EEOC has
proposed amending EEO-1 forms—which have been used to collect
data on gender, race, and ethnicity—to require collection of pay data

70. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effect Standard, 78 Fed.
Reg. 11,460, 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
71. See Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,272 (July 16, 2015)
(to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, and 903).
72. See Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Harassment and Liability for
Discriminatory Housing Practices Under the Fair Housing Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 63,054, 63,054 (Sept.
14, 2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
73. See Equal Access to Housing in HUD Programs Regardless of Sexual Orientation or
Gender Identity, 77 Fed. Reg. 5,662, 5,662 (Feb. 3, 2012) (to be codified at 24 CFR Parts 5, 200,
203, 236, 400, 570, 574, 882, 891, and 982).
74. See OFFICE OF PUB. & INDIAN HOUS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., GUIDANCE
FOR PUBLIC HOUSING AGENCIES (PHAS) AND OWNERS OF FEDERALLY-ASSISTED HOUSING
ON EXCLUDING THE USE OF ARREST RECORDS IN HOUSING DECISIONS 1–7 (2015), https://por
tal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=PIH2015-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9W2-F9CZ].
75. For an account of congressional polarization, see Sarah Binder, The Dysfunctional
Congress, 18 ANN. REV. OF POL. SCI. 85, 86 (2015) (reviewing the literature on the causes of
legislative stalemate and finding that partisanship and electoral competition are undermining
Congress’s “broader problem-solving capacity”).
76. See Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 2199, 113th Cong. (2014).
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for private industry and federal contractors with one hundred or more
employees.77
In other examples, agency guidance has the effect of catalyzing
innovative programs by regulated entities that go beyond the letter of
the guidance. The sexual assault guidelines provide an example. In the
area of sexual assault, beyond what the guidance itself requires, schools
are conducting peer training and education, promoting bystander
intervention programs, and launching efforts to curb excessive alcohol
use.78 For some schools, the framework has broadened beyond the
notion of preventing and providing responses to sexual violence and
gender-based misconduct to more broadly promote “Sexual Respect
and Community Citizenship.”79 This framework is meant to move
beyond a set of responses to individual instances of violence to develop
a campus climate that promotes participation and inclusion. This
reveals that agency intervention is not propelled simply by the contours
of the guidance requirements themselves or the mandates of
bureaucratic regulation, but from a surrounding context in which
universities have their own incentives and institutional motivations to
promote gender inclusion. These motivations might range from
relatively thin compliance-oriented motivations (such as diminishing
Title IX complaints or avoiding a Title IX investigation by the DOE).
But they also may be motivated by a set of thicker motivations that
align with institutional imperatives, such as improving the learning
environment for women and other parties affected by sexual violence
or creating citizens and leaders who understand and are prepared to
engage with diverse communities. In short, institutions may initially be
prompted by an agency-driven framework of compliance, but

77. See Agency Information Collection Activities: Revision of the Employer Information
Report (EEO-1) and Comment Request, 81 Fed. Reg. 5,113, 5,113 (Feb. 1, 2016). This effort
stems from a multiagency initiative to determine potential responses to gender-based wage
disparities. See Presidential Memorandum, Advancing Pay Equality Through Compensation
Data Collection, 79 Fed. Reg. 20,751, 20,751 (Apr. 11, 2014) (directing the Secretary of Labor to
develop a compensation data collection proposal). The EEOC proposal is not yet final and is
opposed by some employers. See Vin Gurrieri, EEOC Gets Polarized Feedback On Rule To Fight
Wage Gap, LAW360 (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/782449/eeoc-gets-polarizedfeedback-on-rule-to-fight-wage-gap [https://perma.cc/G5YG-Y78R].
78. For a description of sexual assault prevention programs operative at a range of
institutions, see infra notes 108–11.
79. See Sexual Respect and Community Citizenship Initiative 2016, COLUM. UNIV., https://
sexualrespect.columbia.edu/sexual-respect-and-community-citizenship-initiative-2016 [https://
perma.cc/2EDQ-FSWK].
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institutions adopt, adapt, and embed commitments that extend further
than these regulations.
This is not to diminish all concerns about process, but it is to
temper them. Some of these forms of federal administrative regulation
are long-standing and quite “soft” in their use of regulatory power. To
the extent that they are prompting change, it may be because
institutions have a broader range of incentives to adopt them than is
evident simply from the mandates of a coercive regulatory regime.
B. Rethinking Civil Rights Regimes
These regulatory responses emerge at a time in which the limits of
traditional modes of civil rights regulation have become more evident.
As a general matter, the turn to agencies can be explained as a response
to the limits of adjudication or complaint resolution as a mechanism of
advancing systemic change. These limitations are in part the result of
judicial doctrines that hamper the ability of plaintiffs to recover in
individual antidiscrimination cases,80 weaken mechanisms such as the
class action device for systemic change,81 as well as curtail the ability of
plaintiffs to bring private enforcement actions in court.82 Agency
regulations thus provide a mechanism for advancing systemic strategies
for a set of enduring problems that courts or other systems are not
always well suited to address. The DOE regulations regarding sexual
assault and harassment on college campuses might be seen in this vein,
80. For a discussion of the limitations of the antidiscrimination framework in Title VII, see
Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 85 (2011) (stating that
“courts largely seem to view discrimination as being motivated by an individual who possesses a
bad motive”); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 467–68 (2001) (describing organizational practices that are
“difficult to trace directly to intentional discrete actions of particular actors,” such as harassment
claims between coworkers and exclusion caused by patterns of interaction, informal norms,
networking, and mentoring); Deborah M. Weiss, A Grudging Defense of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 24
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 119, 124–25 (2012) (discussing how the sharp division between disparate
impact and disparate treatment prevents plaintiffs from addressing “structural” workplace
practices that fit neither the fault-based disparate treatment model or the strict-liability-based
disparate impact model); Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers,
Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1366
(2009) (referring to the disparate treatment–disparate impact framework of Title VII as “a
theoretical straitjacket with two arms”).
81. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 352 (2011) (holding that the proposed
Title VII nationwide class of former and current female employees at Wal-Mart claiming
discrimination in pay and promotion practices lacked the “commonality” of factual and legal
claims required to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23).
82. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (curtailing the ability of
plaintiffs to bring enforcement actions).
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as a response to the limitations of a system of individual complaints (in
agencies or courts) for addressing or preventing what may be a
systemic problem on campuses.
A broader limitation, however, relates not just to efficacy of
adjudication but to the capacity of the antidiscrimination enforcement
framework to respond to contemporary problems of exclusion and
inequality. In part, this reflects the limitation of the antidiscrimination
framework. In the areas of race and gender exclusion, for instance, it is
easy to discern a mismatch between the concept of antidiscrimination
and the mechanisms of exclusion, which might be subtle, implicit, and
the result of “favoritism” rather than simple bias.83 Further,
discrimination (even if we incorporate notions of implicit bias) may be
inadequate to explain exclusion in certain areas. Bias and even
favoritism are only some of the mechanisms that generate racial and
gender exclusion. Discrimination interacts with other mechanisms,
many of which are rooted in long-standing patterns of economic
exclusion including segregation, access to training and education, and
social capital networks.84 In the area of housing, for instance, housing
segregation might be fueled by long-standing and contemporary
discrimination in private housing markets but also fueled by decisions
on where to site low-income housing, the crisis of affordability in
housing, and ostensibly race-neutral barriers such as the availability of
transportation.
The limitations of existing antidiscrimination frameworks have
implications for how agencies might better advance inclusion through
regulation. First, civil rights agencies may need regulatory systems that
respond to multiple barriers of exclusion simultaneously. Relatedly,
agencies may have to develop regulatory responses that connect
solutions to traditional notions of discrimination—that is, bias—with
the solutions to problems that extend beyond bias (for example, in the
areas of employment, addressing skills, social capital, and other
barriers to inclusion).
Second, agencies may need in some instances to set inclusionary
goals without knowing in advance what strategies might best achieve
those solutions. This builds on the insights of those who emphasize the

83. See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 80, at 460.
84. See generally DEIDRE A. ROYSTER, RACE AND THE INVISIBLE HAND: HOW WHITE
NETWORKS EXCLUDE BLACK MEN FROM BLUE-COLLAR JOBS (2003) (providing an account of
how discriminatory networks contribute to occupational segregation).
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need for “experimentation” and responsiveness to local conditions.85
An agency may require states and localities to share and work to
achieve a particular end—decreasing housing segregation—but the
best strategies to achieve that goal might not be fully known in advance
and may be specific to a local community.
A final implication is that addressing systemic barriers may
require agencies to not only prohibit discrimination but also engage an
affirmative set of strategies for advancing inclusion. Inclusionary
regimes would need to do more than sanction the paradigm
noncompliant regulated entities (schools that utterly fail to respond to
sexual assault, for instance); they would also need to provide tools that
help those who share inclusionary regulatory goals achieve them. The
tools for achieving these ends may then differ from the traditional
enforcement tools of individual complaints, adjudication,
investigation, and funding termination.
C. The Emerging Inclusive Regulation
In the face of the limitations of extant regimes, there is evidence
that civil rights agencies are adopting regulatory approaches to
advance inclusion that depart from traditional bureaucratic regulation.
As discussed below, these approaches include (1) competitive grants to
support jurisdictions that seek to advance civil rights goals, (2)
regulatory programs that collapse boundaries between agencies and
between enforcement and regulation, and (3) greater engagement of
affected communities in developing and implementing solutions.
1. From Sticks to Carrots. One possible implication is that civil
rights regimes might need to depend on regulatory “carrots” of grant
making as much as on the prohibitory “sticks” of conditioned spending.
The federal government widely uses grant making to spur “innovation”
in design across a range of areas. But civil rights agencies have not
pervasively used grants in this way.86 Reliance on competitive
government grant awards to those who seek to advance inclusion could
encourage innovation to develop new solutions tailored to local
conditions and expertise. Agencies could use these grant-making

85. See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 21, at 249 (introducing a conceptual framework for inclusion
that engages “crucial stakeholders and encourage[s] experimentation”).
86. There are a few important exceptions to this, most prominently the Magnet Schools
Assistance Act, which provides grants to states and localities to develop racially and economically
integrated magnet schools. See 20 U.S.C. § 7231 (2012).
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programs to provide support to those jurisdictions who seek to advance
equality goals but require funding incentives and substantive direction
to effectively move forward.
An emphasis on competitive grants might build on the framework
of conditioned spending that currently exists. Conditioned spending is
at the heart of affirmative action programs—hiring, pay, and
nondiscrimination requirements placed on employers that receive
federal contracts.87 Employers receiving covered contracts are required
to certify compliance with particular requirements, engage in selfanalyses, and submit to systemic reviews and investigations by the
DOL’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs. Contractors
in violation of the equal-opportunity directives may have their
contracts canceled, terminated, or suspended.88 Title IX requires
educational institutions and districts taking federal funds not to
discriminate on the basis of gender. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 prohibits discrimination by all entities that receive federal funds,89
and the FHA requires the federal government and its grantees to
“affirmatively further fair housing.”90 These conditioned spending
87. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-122, § 503, 87 Stat 355, 393–94, 29 U.S.C.
§ 791 (2012) (requiring federal contractors to develop a plan to employ and advance individuals
with disabilities); Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971, 42,971 (July 23, 2014) (extending
Executive Order No. 13,087 to gender identity); Exec. Order No. 13,087, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,097,
30,097 (May 28, 1998) (extending Executive Order No. 11,478 to sexual orientation); Exec. Order
No. 11,478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12,985, 12,985 (Aug. 8, 1969) (extending Exec. Order No. 11,246 to all
federal employees); Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319, 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965)
(mandating, with regard to “race, creed, color, or national origin,” nondiscrimination in the areas
of “employment, upgrading, demotion, or transfer; recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff
or termination; rates of pay or other forms of compensation; and selection for training, including
apprenticeship”); Regulations Implementing Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/section503.htm [https://perma.cc/YX4QRJTR] (describing the requirements for complying with the obligation to hire and advance
individuals with disabilities); see also Exec. Order No. 13,665, 79 Fed. Reg. 20,749, 20,749 (Apr.
8, 2014) (amending Executive Order No. 11,246 to prohibit discrimination or discharge by federal
contractors who inquire about compensation).
88. See, e.g., Executive Order 11246—Equal Employment Opportunity, U.S. DEP’T
OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/aa.htm [https://perma.cc/PB5K-WE7A].
Indeed, the DOL’s review and investigation process provides a potentially powerful tool for
promoting nondiscrimination as well as affirmative action. In recent years, the DOL has identified
pay and promotion discrimination by federal contractors and brokered remedial settlements. See
Lahey Clinic Settles Pay Discrimination Case with US Labor Department, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR
(Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ofccp/OFCCP20142056.htm [https://perma.
cc/NAG6-B3VB].
89. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012) (prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of race, color, or national origin in federally funded programs).
90. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,272 (July 16, 2015) (to be
codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, and 903). These directives implement section
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programs provide nondiscriminatory baseline prohibitions.
Competitive grants could be deployed in agencies that have spending
and programmatic authority, specifically in agencies that regulate and
support programs involving labor, education, and housing. Grants
could use spending to spur experimentation and to leverage
government funds to develop new approaches to address inequality.
There is evidence that civil rights agencies are placing greater
reliance on competitive grant making of this sort. Under the Obama
administration, three federal agencies—HUD, the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT), and the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA)—initiated a “Partnership for Sustainable
Communities,” which awards state and local grants to build affordable
housing, redesign transportation infrastructure, and promote
environmental efficiency, and the Partnership has issued grants to
support programs in more than twenty-five jurisdictions.91 While the
DOE’s sexual assault guidance has received the most attention, the
DOE has also called for grants to higher-education institutions to
develop innovative responses to problems of sexual assault on campus.
Similarly, the DOL has announced competitive grants to public-private
partnerships to “develop and implement innovative, highquality . . . apprenticeship programs”92 that move workers into “highgrowth occupations and industries.”93 A key focus of the grant program
is spurring partnerships that increase training opportunities for

3608 of the FHA, which requires HUD to administer programs “in a manner affirmatively to
further the policies of [the FHA].” See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2012); see also id. § 3608(d)
(requiring the same of all federal departments and agencies).
91. See About Us, PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES, http://www.sustainable
communities.gov/mission/about-us [https://perma.cc/39AF-MCLX] (describing the goals as using
“agency resources to advance Ladders of Opportunity for every American and every community
. . . helping communities adapt to a changing climate, while mitigating future disaster losses . . .
[and] supporting implementation of community-based development priorities”); List of Case
Studies, PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES, https://www.sustainablecommunities
.gov/case-studies [https://perma.cc/AU7W-FDWG] (providing case studies of jurisdictions that
have launched promising programs with these grants).
92. Opportunities, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/featured/cwip/opportunities
[https://perma.cc/XR6X-ZXNA]. The grant competition will “focus on public–private
partnerships between employers, business associations, joint labor-management organizations,
labor organizations, training providers, community colleges, local and state governments, the
workforce system, non-profits and faith-based organizations.” Id.
93. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NOTICE OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS AND FUNDING
OPPORTUNITY ANNOUNCEMENT FOR THE AMERICAN APPRENTICESHIP INITIATIVE, https://
www.dol.gov/dol/grants/FOA-ETA-15-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/3C2M-MQQ3] (describing a
reward of up to $100 million in grants financed by a user fee generated by the H-1B nonimmigrant
visa program).
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historically excluded groups including women, people with disabilities,
and people of color.94 Another DOL grant program awards grants to
innovative approaches to training low-skilled and historically excluded
workers for employment in the technology industry.95
In addition to leveraging government funds to develop new
strategies for inclusion, the approach evident in programs such as the
DOL grant program and the Partnership for Sustainable Communities
provides the advantage of “pooling” agency resources to meet multiple
goals.96 For instance, in the area of employment this might include both
providing skills training for workers and advancing inclusion of
particular groups. In the area of housing, it would include both building
affordable housing and advancing the civil rights goals of
nondiscrimination and integration.
Yet another example involves the Department of Justice’s (DOJ)
efforts to address the civil rights implications of municipal fines that
target the poor. Alongside the DOJ investigations and settlement
agreements prohibiting excessive court fines for misdemeanor arrests
and quality-of-life violations,97 the DOJ established a $2.5 million
program to help state and local courts develop new policies.98
These grant-making efforts do not yet dispense large amounts of
funding. And as discussed in Part III, below, their capacity will depend
on the quality of the initiatives they develop, the efficacy of oversight,

94. See Opportunities, supra note 92.
95. See DOL Grants: Funding Opportunities, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/
dol/grants/funding-ops.htm [https://perma.cc/MHD6-6SBS] (announcing $100 million in grants to
support innovative approaches to moving lower-skilled workers on the fastest paths to wellpaying information-technology and high-growth jobs in industries like healthcare, advanced
manufacturing, financial services, and other in-demand sectors).
96. See Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 211 (2015) (“[T]he
executive creates joint structures capable of ends that no single agency could otherwise achieve.”).
Professor Daphna Renan also provides some reasons to be cautious about the agency “pooling”
approach from the perspective of administrative law and design. Id.
97. See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 9–15 (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report_1.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/VF36-JGJX] (detailing the DOJ’s finding that law enforcement’s focus on maximizing
revenue imposes hardship on the city’s low-income residents and has a disproportionate impact
on African Americans); Consent Decree at 83–86, United States v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv000180-CDP (E.D. Mo. Apr. 19, 2016) (enumerating elements of the settlement agreement
between the DOJ and the City of Ferguson).
98. See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department
Announces Resources to Assist State and Local Reform of Fine and Fee Practices
(Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-resources-assiststate-and-local-reform-fine-and-fee-practices [https://perma.cc/6CJV-S8JF].
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and the development of systems for diffusing the benefits of effective
solutions. Still, they suggest a promising emerging approach for using
federal grants that provide incentives and financial support to state and
local programs to further statutory and regulatory goals (such as
integration in housing).
2. Collapsing Boundaries. The limitations of existing civil rights
regimes also call for collapsing traditional boundaries between
agencies addressing different substantive domains and rethinking
boundaries between agency functions. This is not just a question of
bureaucratic reorganization. Addressing problems of exclusion might
involve attending to multiple interrelated barriers that affect
communities and individuals, areas that may be the domain of more
than one agency. As an example, racial segregation affects the health
and environmental well-being of communities as well as access to
quality education. Promoting integration may require addressing
transportation, housing, and access to employment.
There is evidence of this collaboration across domains in recent
federal programmatic initiatives. The Partnership for Sustainable
Communities (referenced in the prior subsection as an example of an
increasing emphasis on grants as a source of equality innovation)
combines grant making and oversight across agencies so that recipients
of grants are able to draw on the expertise of multiple agencies and
attend to intersecting barriers and problems facing communities.99
Another aspect of the collaboration is the development of
“sustainability” indicators that communities can use to measure
community well-being related to land use, housing, human health,
transportation, and the environment.100 The programmatic design
stems from the reality that achieving sustainable communities cannot
simply result from regulation in one substantive area but requires
addressing barriers that are within the purview of different agencies
and regulatory regimes.
Next, beyond substantive boundaries, solving emerging and
embedded problems of inequity may involve collapsing the traditional
divide between antidiscrimination enforcement and programmatic
regulation. Civil rights offices of agencies involved in complaint
99. For further discussion of the Partnership for Sustainable Communities, see supra note 91
and accompanying text.
100. Sustainable Community Indicator Catalog, PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE
COMMUNITIES, https://www.sustainablecommunities.gov/indicators [https://perma.cc/RD7MZWJY].
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resolution would need to consider questions of program design—how
agency programs might be designed and structured to promote
inclusion. Similarly, if addressing barriers to inclusion involves
attending to bias in addition to other impediments that individuals and
communities face, this calls for dissolving barriers between
independent agencies traditionally dedicated to antidiscrimination
enforcement (such as the EEOC) and agencies that regulate to further
broader federal policy goals (such as the DOL, responsible for training
and preparing the workforce).
Recent agency initiatives are beginning to collapse the boundaries
between ex post enforcement of violations and ongoing regulation and
programmatic design. The guidance on spending programs and agency
equality directives exemplify this feature. For instance, the DOE’s
efforts to address sexual assault and violence on campus center not
simply on resolving complaints or providing guidance on the procedure
for adjudicating campus sexual assault but on encouraging institutions
to adopt practices to prevent sexual assault. The DOE furthers these
goals through trainings, technical assistance, publications, and
solicitation for grants to support inclusive, preventive practices.
Regulatory implementation of the FHA’s statutory mandate to
affirmatively further fair housing provides another example.101 The
AFFH rule seeks to achieve fair housing goals, not through HUD’s
powers over adjudication or its power to delineate the prohibitory
scope of the fair housing act, but through a system in which
communities and regulated entities (state and local housing agencies)
identify the processes that sustain discrimination and segregation and
take steps to address the identified problems.
Yet another example is found in the design of the DOL’s
apprenticeship initiatives. The program is designed to achieve ends
that are related to workforce development generally and not civil rights
goals in particular. The DOL’s program is aimed at creating industryand government-developed high-quality apprenticeship programs for
training workers in industries that are growing in particular regions. In
seeking proposals, the DOL makes inclusion not a matter for ex post
enforcement (through complaints or DOL compliance reviews of those
receiving federal grants) but a matter of front-end design. The DOL’s
grants establish inclusion of underrepresented groups (in particular
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2012) (requiring HUD to “administer the programs and
activities relating to housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to further the
policies of [the FHA]”).
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women) as a substantive goal. The program seeks to provide strategies
for all grantees to develop inclusive practices and provides grants to
“intermediaries”
(community-based
organizations,
labor
organizations, and workforce organizations) to develop regional
partnerships to increase opportunities for women, racial and ethnic
minorities, people with disabilities, and other traditionally underserved
groups.102
3. Participation and “Crowd-Sourced” Solutions. The changing
civil rights context also suggests the need to engage regulated entities
(employers, schools, and state and local governments) as well as
affected communities in devising and implementing solutions to civil
rights problems. The barriers to inclusion may differ in different
regions. For instance, the form and sustaining mechanisms of housing
segregation may differ between growing metropolitan areas and older
industrial cities. Solutions may also differ in different regions. In the
area of housing segregation, the tools available to expanding, relatively
affluent areas experiencing growth may differ from those in smaller,
shrinking cities.103
The reasons that regulated entities fail to effectuate inclusion may
also differ. Civil rights violators include the hostilely noncompliant as
well as the ineffectual. Sexual assaults may occur on campuses resistant
to adopting any role in responding to complaints, as well as those that
with good intentions advance programs and policies that prove
ineffective. Participation of regulated entities may advance tailored
approaches and development of broadly effective solutions. In this
way, participation can be consistent with emphasizing front-end design
to advance inclusion, rather than ex post enforcement.
Participation of affected communities also provides deeper
understanding of the scope of a particular problem and a pathway to
more effective solutions. Further, organizational theory tells us that
participation in design and implementation allows regulated entities to
connect the inclusionary regulatory goal to their own institutional

102. See ApprenticeshipUSA Investments, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/
featured/apprenticeship/grants [https://perma.cc/2W84-SGGJ] (describing grants to “National
Equity Partners” who would be responsible for developing regional “opportunity partnerships”
across the nation, intended to “increase gender, racial, ethnic and other demographic diversity
and inclusion in apprenticeships, among traditionally underrepresented populations”).
103. See, e.g., William H. Frey, Mid-Decade, Big City Growth Continues, BROOKINGS (May
23, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2016/05/23/mid-decade-big-city-growthcontinues [https://perma.cc/XWH8-XFET] (documenting the continuing growth of large cities).
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objectives. The theory is that participation in developing and
implementing specific strategies allows regulated entities to “buy in”
to the regulatory goals and strategies and allows remedies to better
stick.104
This emphasis on participation is evident in the new HUD AFFH
regulation. A key part of strengthening the rules requiring state and
local governments to advance fair housing was the development of an
assessment tool in which grantees would, with HUD’s assistance, assess
the barriers to fair housing in their communities.105 In identifying
regional fair housing issues and setting goals, grantees must engage in
a structured “community participation process” in which they consult
with community groups and citizens.106
The DOE’s guidance on sexual assault and violence provides
another example. Though the DOE’s guidance calls for participation
with much less specific direction than in the AFFH context, the
guidance appears to be spurring schools to develop programs that
extend beyond the boundaries of the guidance. Specifically, the DOE’s
guidance calls for higher-education institutions to adopt training,
education programs, and materials for the school population and
generally targeted audiences (for example, new students and
athletes).107 This guidance appears to be catalyzing schools to adopt a
range of initiatives beyond the formal requirements of the guidance,
including vigorous counseling and support;108 peer training panels and
104. This is the key insight of the “new governance” literature. See generally Charles F. Sabel
& William H. Simon, Contextualizing Regimes: Institutionalization as a Response to the Limits of
Interpretation and Policy Engineering, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1265 (2012) (discussing the emergence
of regulatory regimes that structure engagement by various stakeholders to address public
problems whose solutions have been hampered by ignorance or uncertainty).
105. See The Assessment of Fair Housing, HUD EXCHANGE, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN
DEV., https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/affh/overview [https://perma.cc/AN2H-4MGV]
(“The rule identifies four fair housing issues that program participants will assess: 1. Patterns of
integration and segregation; 2. Racially or ethnically concentrated areas of poverty; 3. Disparities
in access to opportunity; and 4. Disproportionate housing needs.”).
106. See 24 C.F.R. § 91.100 (2016). The regulation states:
The jurisdiction shall consult with community-based and regionally-based
organizations that represent protected class members, and organizations that enforce
fair housing laws, such as State or local fair housing enforcement agencies (including
participants in the Fair Housing Assistance Program (FHAP)), fair housing
organizations and other nonprofit organizations that receive funding under the Fair
Housing Initiative Program (FHIP), and other public and private fair housing service
agencies, to the extent that such entities operate within its jurisdiction.
Id.; see also id. § 91.105 (detailing citizen-participation requirements for local governments).
107. See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 27.
108. See Campus Choice, S. OR. UNIV., https://inside.sou.edu/campuschoice/index.html [https
://perma.cc/X55K-3GLD].
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discussion groups to move toward cultures of “consent,” “respect,” and
“empowerment”;109 harnessing higher-educational institutional
capacity to conduct research on campus climate and effective
practices;110 and offering trainings that move beyond standard sexual
assault prevention strategies by allowing students to engage visual arts,
dance, media, and theater to express more comprehensive themes of
sexual identity and respect.111
III. REGIME FOR THE FUTURE?
The central aim of this Article is to bring to the fore these new
modes of agency regulation. The question ultimately is whether the
emerging inclusive regulatory regime will be meaningful and effective.
There is too much uncertainty in the current political moment to fully
predict the immediate fate of the guidance documents and regulations
discussed in this Article. Both traditional and innovative forms of civil
rights regulation depend on enforcement, as well as programmatic and
financial support from the federal government. At the same time, some
of the innovations—such as those involving sexual assault reforms in
higher-education institutions—are currently underway,112 and some
aspects may continue even in the absence of federal guidance.
However, this Article’s interest in understanding the potential and
limitations of this new inclusive regulation transcends the current
political moment. The question is what place models that take this
mode of regulation have in civil rights. The new inclusive regulation
emphasizes participation, problem-solving, and solutions that are not
mandated but generated through the iterative process of
implementation. This model is thus open to the critique that it is
insufficiently directive and too precatory.
One can use the example of the AFFH rule, which has been
subject to the criticism that it is too coercive.113 In his confirmation

109. See, e.g., Creating a Culture of Consent, HARVARD UNIV., http://osapr.harvard.edu/
creating-culture-consent [https://perma.cc/7YMD-UVN7].
110. See, e.g., UT System to Launch the Most Comprehensive Sexual Assault Study in Higher
Education, UNIV. OF TEXAS SYS. (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.utsystem.edu/news/2015/08/05/utsystem-launch-most-comprehensive-sexual-assault-study-higher-education [https://perma.cc/GT
8J-FVKW].
111. See, e.g., Sexual Respect & Community Citizenship Initiative: The Arts Option, COLUM.
UNIV., http://artsoption.columbia.edu [https://perma.cc/BL2M-E9VC].
112. For a description of efforts underway at higher-education institutions, see supra notes
108–11.
113. For critiques of the AFFH rule as too coercive, see supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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hearing, incoming Secretary of HUD Ben Carson echoed these
critiques, describing the rule as an example of “people sitting around
desks in Washington, D.C., deciding how things should be done” at the
local level.114 At the hearing, Senator Robert Menendez challenged this
characterization of the rule, stating the AFFH rule was not “top-down”
and instead “requires local communities to assess their own patterns of
racial and income segregation and make genuine plans to address
them.”115 Indeed, the AFFH rule’s heavy reliance on the development
of flexible, locally developed solutions116 has drawn criticism that it
contains insufficient directives to localities to abolish practices that,
over the last forty years, have been proven to have exclusionary effects
(such as exclusionary zoning).117 HUD’s own explanation of the AFFH
rule concedes that this flexibility will lead to indeterminate
outcomes.118
A more general critique is that any move toward voluntary and
competitive grants, collaboration, and tailored problem-solving
depends on shared inclusionary goals. As the discussion in Part I
reveals, inclusionary goals are not shared; indeed, they are deeply
contested. The success of this mode of regulation would require
baseline norms of antidiscrimination that apply to a broad array of
public and private entities, as well as the support and encouragement
of institutions that seek to extend inclusion beyond these norms.
Whether this is desirable depends on how broadly one defines the
baseline civil rights requirements. If nondiscrimination is interpreted
to require furthering fair housing, and if one knows the best strategy
for advancing that goal throughout jurisdictions, it is hard to see the

114. Nomination of Dr. Benjamin Carson Hearing, supra note 10, at 13–14 (testifying further
that he had no problem with integration but did have a “problem with people on high dictating it
when they don’t know anything about what’s going on in the area”).
115. Id. at 17 (statement of Sen. Robert Menendez).
116. See Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,272 (July 16, 2015)
(to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, and 903) (noting that the AFFH process
allows for flexibility in setting goals, prioritizing outcomes, and developing measurement
standards).
117. See, e.g., Lauren Gurley, The Fair Housing Failure—Where Even the Liberal North
Whistles Dixie, AM. PROSPECT (Aug. 6, 2015), http://prospect.org/article/fair-housing-failure
%E2%80%94where-even-liberal-north-whistles-dixie [https://perma.cc/8MNR-4UNZ] (quoting
a fair housing advocate who believes that the AFFH framework is too weak to undo segregated
housing patterns and that HUD should emphasize stronger enforcement through the withholding
of federal funds to counter “massive resistance to changing the segregated status quo”).
118. See Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. at 42,272 (noting that the AFFH
process will encourage communities to plan ahead).
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justification for not mandating that all entities that receive federal
funds work meaningfully to achieve that goal.
The risk of these new modes of regulation is the production of
places with thick forms of inclusion, alongside those with thin inclusion.
Imagine a jurisdiction actively enforcing AFFH, receiving a
sustainability grant to link environmental, housing, and transportation
services and promoting public-private apprenticeship programs to
train a diverse set of workers. Next to it might lie a jurisdiction adhering
to basic nondiscrimination requirements and nothing more. The
normative justification for allowing such variation among regions given
the goals and values at stake is not easy to articulate.
If the new mode of regulation is to hold promise, it will depend on
vigorous oversight by the federal government, which includes
monitoring local plans for progress towards inclusionary goals, study
of effective practices and interventions across jurisdictions, and
meaningful mechanisms for disseminating understanding of what
works and the benefits of adopting these more robust forms of
inclusion.
This mode of regulation also depends on engagement by public
and private actors at the state and local levels. A potential virtue of
inclusive regulation is that it diffuses implementation authority away
from the federal government to subnational government actors. For
instance, the AFFH rule requires governments to self-assess and
develop solutions to problems of fair housing.119 This may serve to
increase subnational capacity to deliberate, evaluate, and address
barriers to inclusion. Inclusive regulations’ dependence on
participation can also build similar capacity among local community
and civil rights groups. These groups become part of the policymaking
process and may then have the expertise, information, and political
networks necessary to hold regulated entities accountable.
Still, even with vigorous implementation the model is likely to
produce variation among jurisdictions. In some sense, this variation is
a concession to a second-best form of regulation: in the context of
resistance to civil rights goals, more specific delineation of
requirements is politically unlikely. However, these new modes of
regulation create a space for those jurisdictions and entities who seek
to do more in a climate of concern about over-regulation.

119. See id.
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CONCLUSION
Any conclusion must return to where this Article begins: the
future of civil rights regulation to advance inclusion is uncertain. Both
“new” and “old” forms of civil rights regulation may now be threatened
as too expansive and coercive. Beyond the mode of relegation, the
inclusionary goals may not have the support of an incoming
presidential administration. Further, some of the specific programs on
which these inclusive regulations depend may not receive funding in
the current federal budget.120 Still, it is worth highlighting the promise
generated by agencies endeavoring to address difficult problems by
using their power in new ways. If these ideas are not taken up in the
immediate future, perhaps they will be revisited before too long.

120. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AMERICA FIRST:
A BUDGET BLUEPRINT TO MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN (2017), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/BUDGET-2018-BLUEPRINT/pdf/BUDGET-2018-BLUEPRINT.pdf [https://perma.cc/AF
2J-F8VC] (proposing eliminating funding for HUD’s Community Development Block Grant
program).

